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ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Frank Munger is a Professor of Law at New York Law School. This essay is a 
revised version of a talk prepared to reflect the theme of New York Law School's 2006 Faculty Presentation 
Day - celebrating 50 years of the New York Law School Law Review - by taking Sally Engle Merry's 
essay, published in the Law Review in 1992, as its starting point. This essay was intended primarily for a 
student audience and conceived as an introduction to a profound and important area of research to which 
Professor Merry has major important contributions. She is among the best-known American law and society 
scholars, has made numerous major contributions to legal anthropology, and is especially well known for her 
scholarship on the relationship between "legal consciousness" and access to rights. As the author explains in his 
essay, he believes that Professor Merry's latest work on the globalization of a human rights convention on 
violence against women can be equally instructive for him and other scholars, as well as for students and their 
scholarship to come. The author thanks Cory Blitz for his valuable assistance in conducting research for this 
article. This material is based in part upon work supported by The National Science Foundation under Grant 
No. 095690. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of The National Science Foundation. 
I. INTRODUCTION: RIGHTS AND THE PROBLEM OF GLOBAL TRANSPLANTATION 
Advocacy for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law is sweeping the 
globe and reshaping governance in developing societies.1 Societies influenced by 
this tidal wave have their own legal cultures, and many have had limited expe-
rience with popular participation in government or accountability under law. 
The global rights discourse is often welcomed by advocates within these societies, 
although the legal reforms it inspires are imposed from above through treaties, 
international conventions, or domestic legislation and constitutional reform. The 
architects of change say that reforming the law will "grow" a civic culture sup-
porting public involvement and government accountability,2 but is such an ex-
pectation well founded where the particular institutions or programs, and 
perhaps the ideas themselves, have been transplanted from societies where their 
form and function have been shaped by a long history? American legal anthro-
pologist Sally Engle Merry is a leading ethnographer of rights.3 Her research 
examines how law becomes an active element in the ongoing life of ordinary 
communities. She has also studied globalization, most recently the grassroots ef-
fects of a human rights treaty on gender violence. Her research both illuminates 
the risks of transplantation and suggests a path to pursue in answering this 
question.4 
In this essay I first describe a globalization project of my own, and then I 
turn to Professor Merry's seminal essay on "legal consciousness," published in this 
Law Review in 1992 for guidance.5 I also describe her recent book on the imple-
mentation of the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW'), which provides a helpful model of 
her method at work. The essay concludes with further questions about my own 
project and the challenges of understanding how law can be used to protect basic 
rights in any society. 
1 . Some of these societies include Hawaii, Delhi, Beijing, Fiji, and Hong Kong. 
2. For example, the World Bank's most recent development initiatives have contained a substantial rule of 
law component. The World Bank claims, for example, that "good governance and strong public institu-
tions lie at the core of achieving sustainable development" and "there is growing evidence that countries 
with vibrant civil societies are more likely to build more equitable and sustainable patterns of develop-
ment," where "helping governments strengthen their legal, regulatory, political, and institutional 
frameworks" contributes directly to this goal. See World Bank, Civil Society - World Bank Develop-
ment Approaches and Initiatives, http://go.worldbank.org/FWZHYU3220 (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
3. Sally Engle Merry is a Professor of Anthropology at New York University and the author of numerous 
influential books and articles on the anthropology of rights, including: SALLY ENGLE MERRY, CoLONIZ-
ING HAWAII (Sherry B. Ortner, Nicholas B. Dirks & Geoff Eley eds., 1944); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, 
GF.TfING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING CLASS AMERICANS 
(1990); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & Soc'y REv. 869 (1988); Sally Engle Merry, 
Spatial Governmentality and the New Urban Social Order: Controlling Gender Violence Through 
Law, AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST, Mar. 2001, at 16 (2001); Sally Engle Merry, Transnational Rights and 
Local Activism: Mapping the Middle, AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST, Mar. 2006, at 38. 
4. See generally SALLY ENCi.i·: MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS & GE;o.;DER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW INTo LocAL Jt1sT1cE (2006). 
5. Sally Engle Merry, Culture, Power, and the Discourse ef Law, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 209 (1992). 
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II. THE RULE OF LAW AND THAILAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT 
The meaning of "rule of law" is itself the subject of an enduring debate in 
our own society. 6 Minimally, rule of law implies observance of known rules and 
procedures for exercising government authority. 7 While in our own society we 
associate the rule of law with accountability for observance of substantive princi-
ples, such as those contained in the Bill of Rights, as well as with observance of 
rules, observance of rules on its own has benefits even for the dictator who desires 
to hold subordinates and subjects to account. This "thin" version of the rule of 
law can have the ironic effect of undermining the legitimacy of attempts to in-
crease the responsibilities of the sovereign or expand the rights of citizens on the 
grounds that neither the process of change nor particular proposals for change are 
in accord with existing law-based prescriptions. 8 
In Europe, the United States, and other established democracies, a "thick" 
version of the rule of law includes principles of accountability that apply to the 
sovereign.9 This version is sometimes referred to as "liberal legality," which com-
bines observance of rules with restraints on the sovereign in the form of substan-
tive and procedural rights enjoyed by citizens and their privately created entities 
(such as corporations). 10 This "thick" version of the rule of law is attractive to 
human rights advocates and to many citizens in societies in which government is 
not responsive to popular will. 11 Liberal legality is also promoted in developing 
societies by powerful international organizations and political actors like the 
World Bank and the United States, which believe that adoption of human rights 
and mechanisms of accountability will make governments more stable and mar-
ket friendly. 12 
My research project concerns the effect of formal "thickening" of democracy 
and rights under Thailand's most recent constitution. In December 2005, King 
6. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW. HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004); see also 
DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1996). 
7. See TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 92-93. 
8. My colleague, Ruti Teitel, has made such an argument about the ironic effects of the rule of law on 
transitional justice. See RuTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JusTICE 21 (2000). 
9. See generally TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 102-13. 
l 0. See Stuart Scheingold, "The Dog That Didn't Bark": A Sociolegal Tale of Law, Democracy, and 
Elections, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION To LAW AND SOCIETY 526 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004). 
11. As Tamanaha notes, the "thick" version - liberal legalism - has strongly anti-democratic implications 
when individual rights conflict with the political power of the majority. See TAMANAHA, supra note 6, 
at 111. Some progressive human rights advocates argue that the restrictive implications are expanding as 
neoliberal governments in Europe and America shrink the public sector through privatization and der-
egulation, thereby expanding the scope of private rights. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Ne-
oliberal Governance: The World Social Forum as Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality, in 
LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARD A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 29 (Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos & Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005). 
12. See TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 136. 
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Prajadhipok's Institute ("KPI") in Bangkok sponsored a conference on the pro-
gress of electoral democracy in Thailand.13 King Prajadhipok was Thailand's 
last absolute monarch, abdicating under pressure in 1932 and replaced by a con-
stitutional democracy. Although a lifelong opponent of this change, King 
Prajadhipok left an ironic legacy in his written abdication, bequeathing his 
power - in spirit if not in law - to the people of Thailand rather than to the 
government that would succeed him. It is in memory of this legacy that the 
Institute carries on its democracy research.14 In 1997, Thailand experienced an-
other constitutional moment, the successful conclusion of five years of contentious 
constitutional reform following a military coup in 1991, bloody riots, and resto-
ration of elected government in 1992. The coup itself was at first supported by 
the Thai people because the democratically elected government that was deposed 
was highly corrupt. But the military did not step down once the corrupt politi-
cians were removed; instead, the generals showed every sign of continuing their 
repressive regime. The Thai people, especially the citizens of Bangkok, rebelled, 
organizing large demonstrations that were suppressed by force. This was not the 
first occasion on which the Thai had rebelled against military rule, but something 
new was indeed taking place. This time the rebellion was viewed on a global 
stage as the world watched nightly on CNN. 
The story of this recent evolution is truly remarkable. The current king, 
Bhumibol Adulyadej, who is revered above all other authorities in Thailand 
though he has little formal power, called the leaders of the military and the dem-
onstrators to the throne room where they prostrated themselves.15 Civilian rule 
was restored soon after, and the process of drafting Thailand's sixteenth constitu-
tion began. By popular demand, the constitution was drafted by a committee of 
experts rather than by politicians. The final draft contained an extensive bill of 
rights, mandates for popular participation in government, new agencies to over-
see elections and to punish corrupt officials, and a mandate for devolution of 
power to democratically elected local governments.16 
Parliament and career central administrators were opposed to the constitu-
tion and would have blocked or weakened provisions guaranteeing the "right to 
have rights," stronger democracy, and greater accountability by rewriting the 
commission's draft if they had been left to their own devices. But the coincidental 
13. Robert B. Albritton, Consolidating Democracy in Thailand: The First Four Years of Democracy under the 
Constitution of 1997, Address at King Prajadhipok's Institute's Seminar on the Temperature of Democ-
racy and Election Behavior in Bangkok, Thailand (Dec. 23, 2005). 
14. See Cornell University, Siam's Political Future, The Monarchy In Transition, http://instructl.cit.cornell. 
edu/courses/hist244/Batson9.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2007); cf Kevin Hewison, Introduction: Power, 
Oppositions, and Democratisation, in PoLITTCAL CHANGE IN THAILAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICI-
PATION 1, 11-12 (Kevin Hewison ed., 1997). 
15. Hewison, supra note 14, at 2. 
16. See CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF T11AI1 . ., B.E. 2540 (1997), especially, but by no means limited to, 
§§ 26-65, 236-247. 
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collapse of the Thai bhat in 1996 thwarted their plans to reject most of the re-
forms.17 International agencies, principally the World Bank and the Asian De-
velopment Fund, imposed "structural adjustment" as a condition of bailout, 
including new laws to regulate the market.18 Their intervention also sent a clear 
message not to derail the so-called "People's Constitution," and the military ulti-
mately agreed by supporting adoption as written after the draft constitution re-
ceived an overwhelming vote of approval in a popular referendum. 19 
This history is complex, and it includes international flows of information, 
ideas, resources, and influence at many levels as well as the Thais' own diverse 
and complex conceptions of governance and rights.20 After re-electing billionaire 
businessman Thaksin Shinawatra Prime Minister by an overwhelming majority 
in 2005, the BBC reported in mid-April 2006 that crowds of protesters in the 
capital city kept the Prime Minister, now viewed as corrupt, from entering his 
office, provoking a threat of military reprisal. Shinawatra had a history of treat-
ing some popular protesters harshly and using the military to suppress and harass 
demonstrators in the Muslim South and elsewhere; although this is not what 
brought the protesters into the streets. A leading human rights lawyer who rep-
resented the Muslim leaders was harassed through defamation suits brought by 
Shinawatra's family for statements he made as an advocate. In 2004, the lawyer 
was abducted and murdered, although the government claimed no connection 
with the perpetrators. In 2006, Shinawatra resigned as Prime Minister amid 
charges of corruption (but remains as "caretaker" until new elections are held) 
rather than face a vote of no confidence.21 These recent events suggest that rights 
and democracy still face challenges in Thailand. 
The hypothesis that the constitutional change will grow a classic civic cul-
ture has been tested through survey research presented at the KPI conference.22 
17. Andrew Harding, South East Asia, 1997-2003: Two Case Studies on the Politics if Law and Devel-
opment, in GLOBALIZATION AND RESISTANCE: LAW REFORM IN ASIA SINCE THE CRISIS (Christoph 
Anton, ed., forthcoming Apr. 2007), available at http://www.law.uvic.ca/seals/forums/attachment.php? 
s=B30a02ae3fl 919cce642dl3e43005 ld5&attachmentid=6. 
18. Nobuyuki Yasuda, Law and Development from the Southeast Asian Perspective: Methodology, His-
tory and Paradigm Change, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 45, 47-52 
(Christoph Antons ed., 2003). See generally Harding, supra note 17. 
19. See CHRIS BAKER & PASUK PHONGPAICHIT, A HISTORY OF THAILAND 255-57 (2005). 
20. For example, the Constitution repeatedly refers to government as "the democratic regime of government 
with the King as Head of the State." See CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF THAIL., B.E. 2540 (1997). The 
monarchy is central to the people's allegiance, and it is the only aspect of constitutional life that has not 
been subjected to reform. See generally Hewison, supra note 14. 
21. See Wikipedia, Thaksin Shinawatra, After the April 2006 Election, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Thaksin_Shinawatra#Thaksin_proposes_reconciliatory_panel (last visited Nov. 9, 2006) (summarizing 
sources, largely newspaper articles, describing the elected PM's status as self-proclaimed "caretaker" head 
of government). 
22. See Robert B. Albritton, Consolidating Democracy in Thailand: The First Four Years of Democracy 
under the Constitution of 1997, Paper delivered at the International Political Science Association Meet-
ing, Fukuoka, Japan (Jul. 12, 2006). 
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Surveys of popular opinion show that the Thai people understand what democ-
racy is and that they strongly embrace the electoral process. 23 But quite contrary 
to the classic concept of a civic culture, the Thai people also expressed little toler-
ance for give and take among opposing political views or for political diversity. 
Further, widespread vote buying, easily documented in other ways, went largely 
unreported when respondents were asked about their knowledge of corruption. 
Better educated, urban Thai were surprisingly skeptical of democracy and intol-
erant while rural, less educated Thai overwhelming supported democracy (but 
not necessarily the rights of others).24 These survey results raise questions about 
the kind of civic culture growing in Thailand, but do not answer more pressing 
questions about law - whether rights are observed, whether policies are more 
egalitarian, whether office holders are more accountable, and generally whether 
law is a meaningful presence in Thai citizens' daily encounters with government 
and each other - all goals of activists who promoted the changes. My ambition 
as a scholar is to conduct empirical research on these questions through further 
surveys and case studies of the impact of new rights and democratic reforms man-
dated by the constitution. 
Ironically, as emerging market societies are pressured to stabilize their econ-
omies by securing individual and property rights through more regulation and 
the rule of law, criticism of government and regulation in developed western 
societies has intensified, also in the name of strengthening markets. Pro-market 
critics of developed democracies argue that governments are too large and ineffi-
cient and should give way to the private sector and to international treaties em-
bodying the rules of the global market.25 The pressure for economic growth has 
given the discourse of rights different faces in the global North and global South 
- advocating downsizing the public domain and social citizenship in developed 
societies at the very moment when the public domain and responsiveness to public 
welfare are being promoted through democratization and expanding the rule of 
law in developing societies. How the two faces of this discourse about the rule of 
law in the global economy interact remains to be studied. Of course, the goals of 
many human rights advocates contrast with both of these views of market devel-
opment in that they seek protection from exploitation and oppression rather than 
more rapid economic development. 
Some scholars view the spread of democracy, decentralization, and the rule 
of law in societies with emerging economies as an imperialistic movement of 
23. See generally Robert B. Albritton & Thawilwadee Bureekul, Developing Democracy Under a New 
Constitution in Thailand 6 (Asian Barometer: A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance, and 
Development, Working Paper No. 28, 2004). 
24. See id. at 17. 
25. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE D~:MOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW RE-
FORM (2004). 
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culture and institutions from the global North to the global South.26 Other advo-
cates, including Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen, argue that democ-
racy and the rule of law make policy decisions more egalitarian,27 while still 
others maintain that democracy, now a global ideal, will make difficult choices in 
a developing society more legitimate.28 Many scholars have warned of what they 
call "transplant" risks,29 namely the risk that regulation and governance pro-
grams established in western societies will have different meaning and unpre-
dictable effects when transplanted to other societies. The existence of such risks is 
supported by studies showing that the meaning and effects of rights are closely 
related to variations in culture and context, even in societies in which rights and 
the rule of law are said to be well established. 30 
26. Indeed, an imponant factor fueling these changes is pressure from international finance and development 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which offer financial assis-
tance to countries with failing economies in exchange for "structural adjustments," including promises to 
reduce expenditures for domestic social programs, to reduce inflation, and to use all available resources to 
pay off loans by foreign investors. Major political and economic actors, such as the United States, also 
advocate adoption of market friendly reforms including laws regulating markets for the benefit of inves-
tors, bankruptcy law, and protection of intellectual property, property rights held mostly by U.S., and 
European-owned transnational corporations. "Third wave" globalization also includes pressure by pow-
erful global market panicipants for adoption of institutions of political accountability familiar in devel-
oped western societies to counter a perceived inability of governments in many emerging market societies 
to control instability, extreme inequality, and corruption. Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cesar A. Rodri-
guez-Gravito, Law, Politics, and the Subaltern in Counter-hegemonic Globalization, in LAW AND 
GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW 1, 2 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cesar A. Rodriguez-Gravito eds., 
2005). See generally MICHAEL GOLDMAN, IMPERIAL NATURE: THE WORLD BANK AND STRUGGLES 
FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (2005); JosEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION 
AND !Ts DISCONTENTS (2003). 
27. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
28. See generally 1 WoRLD BANK, THE WoRLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: LAW AND JusTICE FOR DEVELOP-
MENT (Rudolph V. van Puymbroeck ed., 2003). 
29. See MERRY, supra note 4, at 19, 134-39. 
30. A panicularly controversial claim about transplantation risks has been made by leaders of some developing 
Asian societies who claim that an authoritarian, non-democratic path to development is consistent with 
"Asian values," and that Western "liberal" values are inappropriate and harmful for their societies. See 
generally AsiAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAWTHEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW 
IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004); THE EAST 
As1AN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999). The distinction 
is sometimes drawn between individual rights and collective rights. As Professor Merry has pointed out, 
the distinction itself is specious - often depending on the source of the benefits that the rights holder is to 
enjoy rather than a difference in the group nature of the interests at stake. E-mail from Sally E. Merry, 
Professor of Anthropology and Law and Society, N.Y. Univ., to author (Jun. 14, 2006, 10:21 EST) (on 
file with author). Thus, voting, freedom of speech, and ownership of property are said to be individual, 
while a right to housing, food, or an education is viewed as a different order; even though both are 
meaningful only because they are widely, and at best universally, enjoyed thus shaping the quality of the 
society as a whole as well as the lives of individuals. Critiques of the Asian values claim by scholars in the 
East as well as the West are well established, pointing to the overlap between societies and diversity 
within societies. The Asian values claim is often made to legitimate traditional forms of hierarchical and 
non-democratic authority, thus deriving the legitimacy of authoritarian rule from traditional respect for 
family and community. There is no necessary link between these levels of social organization, and indeed, 
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In the remaining parts of this essay, I will describe a path for my research 
on the effects of transplanted legal institutions, taking as my starting point a 
foundational discussion of "legal consciousness."31 
Ill. THE LOCAL CONTEXT OF LAW 
It comes as no surprise to law students that the law does not always seem to 
play out as the words in the constitution, statutes, or court decisions might at first 
suggest. Law students quickly learn to live with ambiguity because ambiguity, 
as well as the illusion of certainty, is essential to the law's power in the hands of 
an advocate. Creating meaning through purposive construction and contextual 
understanding is the lawyer's art. We learn that multiple meanings are always 
possible, and any one of them may become the authoritative meaning when we 
are successful advocates, despite how stable the law seems in our everyday world. 
In everyday life, law often has texture, a feel of continuity, and a reassur-
ing, if unarticulated presence that is undisputed because it is taken for granted. 
As one pair of scholars observed recently to illustrate this point, "we respect our 
neighbors' property because it is theirs."32 We speak openly and in public to one 
another about what we like or dislike about those in power because we are free to 
do so. More tentatively perhaps, we are indignant with police or motor vehicle 
department clerks when they violate our expectation of responsive and respon-
sible conduct. We know the police and bureaucrats have the power to inconve-
nience us temporarily, and so we are strategic; but we do not live in fear of their 
arbitrary power.33 We conduct these daily affairs guided by "practical conscious-
ness,"34 meaning we act knowingly but not self-consciously, in that we do not 
think about the UCC bills and notes sections every time we use the ATM to 
deposit a check or get cash. Asked to explain why we feel secure conducting our 
lives this way, we often choose to talk about accountability and, ultimately, about 
in countries such as China, Vietnam, and Thailand, the mix of forms varies greatly rather than establish-
ing an "Asian" pattern. 
31. Merry, supra note 5. 
32. PATRICK EWICK & SusAN Sn.BEY, T11E COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 15 
(1998). 
33. At the time this essay was written, a fractious mayoral campaign was developing in Newark, New Jersey 
between Cory Booker and the incumbent Sharpe James. James was shown engaging in numerous cam-
paign irregularities in a well publicized documentary, Street Fight, which I show to my Municipal Law 
class. James began five terms previously as a reform mayor, but after achieving wide popularity, has been 
accused of cronyism and using the police to harass his opponents. I ask my students how such a culture 
could develop - affirmed by re-election - from such promising beginnings. STREET FIGHT (Public 
Broadcasting System 2006). 
34. Sociologist Anthony Giddens describes two forms of consciousness which guide our daily lives. One is 
"discursive consciousness" which is developed from reasons for doing things. The other is "practical con-
sciousness" or the unselfconscious routines that allow us to get dressed and leave for work, open a door, or 
replace a light bulb without having to think about it. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CoNSTITIITION OF 
SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE TllEORY OF STRUCTIJRA110N (1986). 
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the rule oflaw (or some of us, about the UCC). But through our unselfconscious 
behavior, we have given meaning to the law before we have reflected on our 
reasons for doing so. 
This is the power of legal consciousness. 
IV. MERRY ON LAW AND LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
Leading legal anthropologist Sally Engle Merry was one of the first scholars 
to explore the concept oflegal consciousness.35 Her path-breaking article draws 
on her study of conflict, litigation, and mediation in a New England district court 
to illustrate the role of legal consciousness in bridging the gap between law-in-
action and law-on-the books.36 
Professor Merry directs our attention to everyday actions that are shaped by 
the law and which, in turn, shape the law itself, and in particular to "ideas about 
what law is and what it can and cannot do."37 According to Merry, law is not 
an independent, external factor shaping society. Rather, she says, 
... law and society are mutually defining and inseparable. One fun-
damental point is that law is intimately involved in the constitution 
ef social relations and the law itself is constituted through social rela-
tions. Daily talk about the law by ordinary people contributes to defin-
ing what law is and what it is not. Ordinary people share 
understandings of law and the way it affects their lives and defines 
their relationships. These understandings, which can be called legal 
consciousness, include people's expectations of the law, their sense of 
legal entitlement, and their sense of rights.38 
Her work has helped to open a new window on our understanding of rights and 
the dynamic process by which consciousness of rights takes shape. Perceptions of 
rights, in turn, help to explain why and how the law becomes active or fails to 
become active in particular individuals' lives. Drawing on her research on the 
legal consciousness of ordinary citizens, she observes, 
[t]heir ideas were derived from their experiences in court and with 
lawyers as well as from the media. These ideas, however, were not 
necessarily the same as the doctrines of the legal system itself. For ex-
ample, people who sought judicial relief in the law courts for neighbor-
hood problems in the New England towns I studied in the 1980s based 
their actions on conceptions they had of rights to property and protec-
tion - conceptions often at variance with the law itself. Many people 
felt that they could control who stepped onto their property, and many 
35. Merry, supra note 5. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. at 214. 
38. Id. at 209-10. 
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felt entitled to shoot anyone who did. Thus, they held an expanded 
notion of property rights that were less circumscribed than those actu-
ally enforced by the courts.39 
Professor Merry's research on mediation of cases in the lowest tier of a court 
system reveals the power of some actors to shape perceptions and the meaning of 
law and its relevance to these problems. Their power is the power to give a 
name to a relationship, a dispute, a conflict, even a personal identity, and, thus, 
to suggest the relevance - or irrelevance - of law. 
Reframing is an aspect of the power of naming-the power to assert 
what a problem is and what should be done about it. In these settings, 
naming is done by people who are perceived to hold particular author-
ity by virtue of their institutional location and their professional exper-
tise, often revealed in their language. Consequently, plaintiffs are 
persuaded to acquiesce to these names, to abandon their efforts to get 
help from the court for problems defined in legal terms and to accept the 
court's redefinition of the problem as a social one deserving ongoing 
supervision of their social relationships. 40 
Neighbors entered the court with a sense of entitlement and the reasonableness of 
their own actions. But, instead of receiving protection for their entitlements, the 
parties received "lectures and advice about how to organize their lives, encour-
agement to come back for mediation, and promises that something will be done to 
the defendant if the problem recurs."41 Thus, by exercising their power to re-
frame an event or a social relationship in a non-legal, moral, and therapeutic 
discourse,42 the court officials denied the very forms of protection and help "prom-
ised by the legal system itself' and offered non-legal solutions in their place.43 
In other settings that I have studied, for example in my research on the 
effects of new disability rights and my examination of the implementation of 
39. Id. at 214. 
40. Id. at 218. In the law and society research canon, disputes must first be named (i.e. perceived to exist), 
then responsibility assigned to someone, an entity, to oneself, or to chance ("blaming"), and lastly, a remedy 
sought through whatever formal or informal means seem to be available ("claiming"). See generally 
William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of 
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . .. , 15 LAw& Soc'y REV. 631 (1980). Conflicts exist every-
where in society. Yet the number that result in naming - awareness of a grievance - is miniscule, and 
the proportion that result in blaming or claiming, much smaller still. Perceptions and meanings are 
critical to the interpretation of social interaction that might be named, blamed, or claimed. 
41. Merry, supra note 5, at 225. 
42. A discourse is more than an explicit invocation of non-legal authority; it conveys a taken-for-granted 
common sense, a perspective that is complete in itself, by establishing what there is to say about what we 
perceive. Cf. Michel Foucault, Politics and the Study of Discourse, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: 
STUDIES IN GovER;>;ME1'TALITY 53, 58-59 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991). 
A discourse guides how we express what we perceive and, therefore, also influences what we know. 
43. Merry, supra note 5, at 225. 
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welfare reform law, discourses were selected less self-consciously and less instru-
mentally than the discourse used by court officials studied by Professor Merry. 
The subjects in my research described conflict and conflict resolution using dis-
courses influenced by family, peers, education, media, and an array of other fac-
tors which shape cognition with no less powerful an effect.44 For example, in a 
study of the legal consciousness of persons with disabilities, most of the people we 
spoke to with disabilities could describe the provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act ("ADA") in general terms, yet none of them had ever formally 
invoked the Act to remedy discrimination or to gain access to employment.45 
Further, our interviewees sometimes chose a discourse to describe exclusion from 
employment or acts of discrimination in non-legal, yet - to them - compelling 
terms. 46 For instance, some described their exclusion using a discourse of religion 
that emphasized forgiveness without mentioning the law. Others employed a 
discourse of the market to explain the efficiency, and thus the appropriateness, of 
a business's failure to employ them or to offer accommodations, even though that 
might be contrary to the law. Some of our interviewees, who strongly opposed 
affirmative action in a racial context, suggested (correctly or incorrectly) that the 
ADA was similar, and for this reason they would never invoke the ADA's provi-
sions. For each individual, consciousness of the law was shaped by a variety of 
factors, including family, peers, and prior experiences in school or at work, that 
led to widely varied perceptions of rights never anticipated by the drafters of the 
law. 47 
V. GLOBALIZATION OF LAW 
Professor Merry's illuminating description of the interactive process that 
shapes perceptions of law can help us understand the cross-cultural migration of 
rights and legality. Legal consciousness provides a window into the process by 
which formal legal change takes shape, but something more is needed. Conscious-
ness of rights in developing societies is both a terrain of conflict and the point of 
intersection between global and local flows of information and advocacy about 
rights. Research on the impact of global and local advocacy for rights requires 
examination of the transnational flows of ideas about rights and their translation 
within each local context. 
As the global movement to adopt formal rights, rules of law, and democracy 
spreads, the meaning of law is framed in discourses from many sources - West-
44. See generally DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN 
THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003); Frank Munger, Dependency by Law: 
Welfare and Identity in the Lives of Poor Women, in LIVES IN THE LAW 83 (Austin Sarat, Lawrence 
Douglas & Martha Umphrey eds., 2002). 
45. ENGEL & MUNGER, supra note 44, at 1-19. 
46. See id. at 142-67. 
47. Id. 
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ern jurisprudence, international human rights agencies, the World Bank and its 
private counterparts, and dominant political actors, to name some of the most 
important ones. But the meaning of law is also shaped by the actions and dis-
courses of politicians, media outlets, activists, legal professionals, community 
leaders, as well as through everyday interactions within networks of friends and 
family and on the street, namely the sources in closest contact with the citizens in 
Chinese villages holding elections for the first time,48 Thai administrative dis-
tricts whose governance has been reformed under the new constitution,49 or 
women in villages now protected from discrimination by CEDA W. The mean-
ing of rights or democracy may be translated and transplanted not once, but many 
times, ending with the local contexts in which they are intended to become part of 
the consciousness of ordinary people. 
Professor Merry's recent book on globalization and transplantation of rights 
created by CEDA W describes the final and most critical step in the globalization 
process which takes place locally.50 As she puts it, "[i]n order for human rights 
ideas to be effective . . . they need to be translated into local terms and situated 
within local contexts of power and meaning. They need, in other words, to be 
remade in the vernacular."51 Even so basic a human right as freedom from vio-
lence against women has not been easy to establish at this level. The transna-
tional human rights movement to end discrimination against women has 
provided critical resources for local advocates, but no easy answers for creating 
rights consciousness among perpetrators or their victims. Professor Merry ob-
serves that "human rights ideas" are "embedded in cultural assumptions about the 
nature of the person, the community, and the state" and "do not translate easily 
from one setting to another."52 Activists must possess a kind of"double conscious-
ness" as they translate human rights concepts between the discourse of the trans-
national community that "envisions a unified modernity" and the discourses of 
particularism of national and local settings. 53 
Observing the translation of ideas about gender violence during discussions 
between national delegates to the United Nations committee, within transna-
tional NGOs, and by local advocates, Merry identified potential dilemmas that 
arise from differences in perspectives on rights. First, Merry says, "human rights 
law is committed to setting universal standards using legal rationality, yet this 
48. See Jamie P. Horsley, Village Elections: Training Ground far Democratisation, CHINA Bus. REV., 
Mar. -Apr. 2001, http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0103/horsley.html. 
49. CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF THAIL. § 285. 
50. See MERRY, supra note 4. Her research on CEDAW implementation included observation of conditions 
in Hawaii, Delhi, Beijing, Fiji, and Hong Kong. 
51. Id. at 1. 
52. Id. at 3. 
53. Id. 
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stance impedes adapting those standards to the particulars of local context."54 
Universal standards may seem irrelevant to individuals contending with local 
conditions that were never contemplated by the drafters. Second, "human rights 
ideas are more readily adapted if they are packaged in familiar [i.e. local and 
vernacular] terms," but quickly lose their transformative power as a result be-
cause they fail to "challenge existing assumptions about power and relation-
ships."55 Of particular concern in societies with little familiarity with rights of 
individuals, victims may not perceive, or "name," discrimination or even violence 
directed against them as unjust.56 As Merry says, "to promote individual rights-
consciousness, institutions have to implement rights effectively. However, if 
there is little rights consciousness, there will be less pressure on institutions to take 
rights seriously."57 
A third dilemma is that human rights have a profoundly ambiguous rela-
tionship to the authority of the state itself, challenging the "states' authority over 
their citizens at the same time as it reinforces states' power."58 The dilemma is 
familiar to American lawyers, but in the United States, lawyers are protected as 
"officers of the court" even when mounting serious challenges to the state's own 
authority. In societies with little experience with liberal legalism, and more im-
portantly, few institutional protections for those who confront the state in the 
name of rights, conflict with the state can be dangerous, as the fate of the Muslim 
human rights lawyer in southern Thailand tragically illustrates.59 
Rights consciousness, in the sense used here, involves the way one perceives 
the relationships and actions that concern rights. As Merry notes, rights framed 
in transnational discourse are typically individualistic and universal.60 In Eu-
rope and America, particular individual rights are valued primarily because they 
contribute to the political and economic viability of a capitalist economy by pro-
tecting property while motivating and enabling voluntary participation by 
workers. 61 In societies in which social and economic institutions have developed 
54. Id. at 5. 
5 5. Id. Conversely, a problem arises from the fact that "to have local impact, human rights ideas need to be 
framed in terms of local values and images, but in order to receive funding, a wider audience, and 
international legitimacy, they have to be framed in terms of transnational rights principles." 
56. On the concept of"naming," see Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, supra note 40. Merry emphasizes this point in 
her discussion of CED AW, and illustrates the psychology of naming in her discussions of gender violence. 
See MERRY, supra note 4, at 24-27. 
57. MERRY, supra note 4, at 5. 
58. Id. 
59. See Public Statement, Amnesty International, Thailand: Angkhana Neelapaijit Must be Given Immedi-
ate Protection (Nov. 1, 2006), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/lndex/ENGASA390162006? 
open&of=ENG-2S3. 
60. See generally MERRY, supra note 4. 
61. See generally T.H. MARSHALL & ToM BoTTOMORE, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1992). Even 
the characterization of some rights as "individual," such as property and freedom of speech, while others 
829 
CULTURE, POWER, AND LAW 
along different paths, other "individual" rights may seem compelling, for example 
rights to maintain family or community relationships or to maintain religious 
practices and other taken-for-granted features of family and community life.62 
Gender inequality exists in virtually all societies, but in many so-called 
"traditional" societies, practices forbidden by the transnational community's inter-
pretation of CEDA W's language may be permitted by local custom and even by 
national or local law. Women themselves may be reluctant to change such prac-
tices because they are granted respect or status for submitting to them or because 
they will be punished for violating them. In Hong Kong, for example, the strug-
gle for gender equality under inheritance laws became entangled with arguments 
about preserving the traditional family. 63 Even violence may be perceived as an 
acceptable form of "discipline" for transgression of traditional rules of behavior.64 
Over a lifetime, identity as a woman may be strongly influenced by adherence to 
customs that maintain a woman's status as subordinate and an object of violence. 
In some instances, such practices may not be perceived as unjust, or, even if per-
ceived as unjust, as having a dual character because the woman is both a subject 
of rights and a subject of the conventions of family relationships. Like persons 
with disabilities who know about the ADA but may adopt another discourse to 
describe exclusion, Merry discovered that women in several societies faced diffi-
cult choices when their rights-based opposition to discriminatory practices seemed 
to undermine other important local aspects of family and community life. 
For women who wanted to change the way they are treated within existing 
family and community relationships, a human rights framework 
does not displace other frameworks but adds a new dimension to the 
way individuals think about problems . . . rights are only one way of 
thinking about their injuries and about justice. Many women in these 
two places attributed their injuries to their relatives' failure to abide by 
the norms of kinship and care. 65 
In other words, the women possessed "a double subjectivity as rights-bearers and 
as injured kinsmen and survivors . . . two somewhat distinct sets of ideas and 
meanings that coexist."66 Double subjectivity has profound implications for the 
global implementation of human rights. Rights permit the victims of discrimina-
are characterized as "collective," such as food or shelter, is historically and culturally specific. Food and 
housing may be no less legitimate individual rights, but they would require far greater restructuring of 
our basic institutions; institutions already structured to preserve property and guarantee political 
participation. 
62. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
63. MERRY, supra note 4, at 202-03. 
64. Id. at 25. 
65. Id. at 180. 
66. Id. at 181. 
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tion and oppression to step outside the framework of existing relationships, but 
then they often find themselves perceived and treated as outsiders.67 
Even where the victims have embraced rights consciousness, the interweav-
ing of rights and local institutions may create other strategic dilemmas. For ex-
ample, Hindu women facing discrimination under Hindu customary law found 
that their advocacy for universal rights and opposition to customary law quickly 
became identified with intolerant Hindu conservatives' attempts to deny auton-
omy to the Muslim minority to follow their own customary practices.68 Fijian 
women who opposed customary village mediation practices, which permitted 
avoidance of serious punishment for crimes such as rape, were confronted with 
the importance of mediation in preserving village life.69 
On balance, the willingness of an individual to sustain a rights framework 
"depends in part on the way institutions respond to their rights claims."70 
If their claims are treated as unimportant, unreasonable, or insig-
nificant, they are less likely to take a rights approach to their problems. 
On the other hand, if their experience of claiming rights is positive, in 
that institutional actors support and validate these claims, they are 
more likely to see themselves as rights-bearing subjects and to claim 
rights in the next crisis. . . . Poor women think of themselves as having 
rights only when powerful institutions treat them as if they do.71 
Thus, "[i]t is not unusual for individuals to retreat from a rights consciousness of 
grievance to a kin-based one. Nor is it surprising that one would try on this 
identity, drop it, and try again."72 
This conundrum - the reciprocal effect of rights consciousness and effective-
ness of rights - poses a particularly important and complex challenge for human 
rights advocates. Professor Merry places this dilemma in a practical light. 
Women may know about new rights that protect them from violence; at the same 
time, they have learned to deal with oppressive, sometimes violent, relationships 
as matters of kinship and custom imposed and overseen by others - the family, 
the village, or the religious community. These dual discourses have different im-
plications for understanding how these women perceive their identities and for 
determining important continuing relationships. Rights that work for them will 
alter their perception of rights, the rule of law, and perhaps even of themselves. 
Rights that are not taken seriously by authorities soon diminish in importance 
67. See id. at 16; see also Barbara Yngvesson, Re-examining Continuing Relations and the Law, 1985 
Wis. L. REv. 623, 630. 
68. MERRY, supra note 4, at 105. 
69. Id. at 117. 
70. Id. at 215. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 217. 
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and have less of a role in shaping consciousness of alternative courses of action or 
identity. 73 The conundrum is: Where does the cycle begin? Most civil rights laws 
depend largely on complaints by victims. 74 The victim must make a strategic 
choice among alternatives that have uncertain outcomes. Merry's fieldwork 
shows that it is here that the dynamics of social interaction play an important role 
in establishing features of every day life that are taken for granted or by creating 
possibilities for new perceptions.75 "Taking on rights," Merry concludes, "is a 
difficult process and fraught with ambivalence. Asserting rights often comes at a 
price."76 
At every level of discourse described by Merry - at the U.N., national 
program development, and local implementation - rights are contested, resisted, 
strategically reinterpreted, and ignored. Yet, Professor Merry's research shows 
that rights have the capacity to give meaning to social relationships and to influ-
ence unselfconscious social behavior. By examining CEDAW, she sought to un-
derstand how contentious rights debates might (or might not) lead to reduction in 
practices that were discriminatory or violent toward women. 77 Change occurred 
in many societies, although unselfconscious and uncontested equal treatment of 
women remains a distant goal. The most promising path, she concludes, involves 
use of local knowledge of customs and values to facilitate adaptation and accom-
modation rather than coercive implementation of the transnational community's 
vision of universal rights. 78 
VI. THE RULE OF LAW IN THAILAND 
Like CEDAW, Thailand's new constitutional provisions for rights and de-
mocracy are formal, "top down" prescriptions, and like CEDAW, Thailand's con-
stitutional language was negotiated by a committee at the center of broader 
interactions among many national and transnational participants. Unlike 
CEDAW, however, Thailand's constitution reflects a long history of"bottom up" 
pressure for democracy and the "right to have rights." Thailand's constitutional 
language derives meaning from Thai legal culture and political history as well as 
73. Indeed, local authorities are unlikely to support human rights consciousness until they themselves perceive 
the treatment of women in terms of rights and believe in taking them seriously. 
74. With this problem in mind, CEDAW requires annual reports by signatories and invites critique by NGOs 
and the members of an oversight body in order to promote compliance without exclusive reliance on 
victims. Significantly, comparison of the effectiveness of civil rights laws in the United States suggests 
that government-initiated processes, such as those prescribed by the Voting Rights Act, have been far more 
effective in eliminating race discrimination than those which rely on victims to bring compliance lawsuits. 
See generally RICHARD Lb:MPERT &JosEPH SANDERS, AN lNVlTAUON TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: 
DESERTS, DISPUTES, AND DISTRIBUTION (2d ed. 1989). 
75. See generally MERRY, supra note 4. 
76. Id. at 216. 
77. Id. at 21-27. 
78. See id. at 227-29. 
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from the transnational flow of ideas and advocacy. Recent surveys suggest that 
concepts like democracy and rule of law are familiar to most Thai, although they 
are not necessarily understood in the way that they are by the transnational 
community. 79 
Merry's research on globalization of rights holds many lessons for a study of 
the evolving role of rights in Thailand. "Translating rights into the vernacular" 
is Merry's shorthand for the process that involves translating rights into local 
contexts, which gives shape to the effects of those rights. First, rights must make 
sense to the rights bearer. That is, the rights bearer must perceive the possibility 
of benefits from "taking on" rights. This translation may involve interpretation 
of rights to fit a local context, by giving a contextual meaning to "injury," "dis-
crimination," or "inequality." Rights may seem irrelevant when the individual 
perceives no wrong or injury, and those rights may be rejected when the price of 
changing ongoing relationships appears to be too great. Rights advocates hope 
that rights will be respected and accommodated with a minimum of change in the 
desirable qualities of ongoing relationships, but this outcome has been rare in the 
implementation of women's rights. Second, shaping rights to fit local contexts is 
facilitated by translators who acquire power over when and how rights become 
active. Merry's anthropology of rights in a New England court describes judicial 
power to prevent complainants from obtaining a remedy for the violation of their 
rights and instead to seek a compromise by choosing a therapeutic rather than 
legal discourse. Her research on women's rights in five societies suggests the 
power of a broad range of local translators as well as translators at higher politi-
cal and institutional levels. 80 These steps - individual perception, culture, 
ongoing relationships, and translation - provide starting points for research on 
rights consciousness and the power of translators to facilitate or impede its 
development. 
In my concluding section, I describe two ethnographic studies of recent 
struggles over the rule of law in Thailand to illustrate the usefulness of Merry's 
anthropological approach to rights consciousness. The first is a study oflocal elec-
tions conducted shortly before constitutional reform in rural villages in Thai-
land. 81 The research suggests that old patterns of deference may not be altered by 
the renewed emphasis on election integrity in formal constitutional language. 
79. See Albritton & Bureekul, supra note 23. 
80. Professor Merry's research was conducted in Hawaii, Delhi, Beijing, Fiji, and Hong Kong. 
81 . The new Constitution establishes an independent election oversight commission intended to reduce vote 
buying and other forms of corruption. CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF THAIL. §§ 136-148. While the 
commission has had some success, some observers contend that there is no reason to believe that election 
practices have been radically altered as a result of constitutional reform. Scholars still debate whether 
survey data demonstrate that corruption is a continuing problem or a problem that has been greatly 
exaggerated. For a helpful analysis of the problems of measurement and interpretation see Albritton & 
Bureekul, supra note 23, at 39. Post-reform election practices await further careful ethnographic 
research. 
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The second study describes the emergence of a social movement of impoverished 
villagers in Northeast Thailand to protect their homes and livelihood from defor-
estation, dam building, and other massive development projects. The rise and 
success of this movement suggests that under the proper conditions, participation 
and justice can be given meaning by non-electoral means and through the initia-
tive of ordinary people, but rights might play a limited role. 
An ethnographic study of village democracy in rural northern Thailand 
found that a traditional discourse of reciprocal obligations between patrons and 
clients created an alternative framework for perceiving authority and legitimacy 
that is different from the transnational meaning of democracy or rule of law.82 
Patron-client relationships prevalent in Thailand, as well as in many other 
Asian and Latin American societies, create continuing bonds of reciprocity. In-
stead of voting for candidates on the basis of promises to serve the public and obey 
the law for which they will be held accountable, some voters displayed loyalty to 
candidates with whom they have a continuing patron-client relationship. A 
candidate in a position of power as an employer, land-holder, or respected village 
leader may have created many clients. Further, other relationships may likewise 
create a sense of obligation among some voters, such as a candidates' financial 
support for a temple and endorsement by its principal monk. While critics point 
to the widespread practice of vote buying by candidates, surveys reveal that many 
voters do not perceive this practice as a form of corruption. One scholar suggests 
that the proper understanding of such payments is that they play into the tradi-
tion of reciprocity created by patron-client relations and are perceived as creating 
an obligation rather than as a payoff to ignore a civic responsibility. 83 
We might describe this as paternalistic democracy. Voters choose a candidate 
with whom they have a reciprocal relationship rather than evaluating the candi-
date's ability or past performance. A vote may be an expression of loyalty, not a 
civic judgment. Voters may believe (but we will not know without more re-
search) that an elected official is entitled to his or her office and non-accountable. 
It is possible that personal gain, preferential treatment of relatives and business 
associates, and other self-serving acts common among local office holders, are con-
sidered irrelevant to this relationship, and may have little effect on the legitimacy 
of the office-holders' authority. Likewise, the particular relationship between 
82. In most societies, including our own, there are alternative discourses about responsibility for the well being 
of others and about responsibility for injury to others. My study of the ADA found that the barriers 
created by a disability were sometimes perceived in non-legal terms that rendered the law irrelevant or 
inappropriate. See ENGEL &MUNGER, supra note 44, at 142-67. Professor Merry similarly found that 
CEDAW implementation encountered alternative discourses about women's roles in society that seemed to 
conflict with CEDAWs underlying values. MERRY, supra note 4, at 8. CEDAW is grounded in a 
secular belief that women should be equal to men, socially autonomous, and free of oppressive relation-
ships, but one or more of these prescriptions often conflicts with valued local traditions. 
83. DANIELARGlllROS, D~:MOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION IN PROVINCIAL THAILAND 
230 (2001). 
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supporters and office-holders may legitimate favoritism, so that candidates are 
not expected to serve the general public but rather the interests of loyal clients. If 
such interpretations prevail (and we do not yet know the answer), Thailand's 
practices of democracy and the rule of law may be embedded in traditional pa-
tron-client relationships and function differently from democracy and the rule of 
law in societies where these practices are thought to be corrupt, even though they 
occur with some regularity. 84 
A second ethnographic study describes emergence of a movement to resist 
displacement from the land in Thailand's rural Northeast. Calling itself the "As-
sembly of the Poor,'' the movement is the latest of several movements that reflect 
the growing economic marginalization of agricultural communities during Thai-
land's industrialization from the 1960s to the present. The Thai word meaning 
"assembly" was deliberately chosen to evoke the succession of rural movements 
over the previous twenty-five years that also called themselves "assemblies." The 
movement reflects not only the growing activism among rural Thai and the ef-
fectiveness of the committed NGO organizers who have assisted them, but also 
the special meaning of the environment in Thai culture. 85 Respect for the envi-
ronment is deeply embedded in Buddhism, and Buddhism in turn is one impor-
tant element of the culture that underlies Thai legality. 86 The underlying 
culture, Thailand's "civic religion,'' also includes discourses of national identity, 
and the monarchy.87 The civic religion establishes taken-for-granted values and 
ideas that are fundamental to political exchange about the welfare of the Thai 
people and legitimate use of authority, and it provides a powerful discourse for 
social movement participants as well as officials, politicians, and other power 
holders.88 Buddhist values embedded in the discourse of Thai national welfare 
84. The thoughtful observer may see a similarity between paternalistic democracy, as I have described it in 
Thailand, and loyalty of American voters to parties or to patronage. These apparent similarities raise 
important questions about what it means to establish a civic culture that creates a meaningful democracy. 
The answer has to do with trust in the electoral system. American voters may violate the norm of civic 
responsibility, but they do so knowing they have the power to "vote the bastards out." And they do vote 
them out with some regularity. In Thailand, this idea of civic behavior - and of the possibility of 
accountability - may still be taking shape. Some Thai voters described in the study may believe they are 
obligated to vote for a patron or vote buyer while others may believe that voters have no legitimate role in 
directing office holders' performance of their job. 
85. Some parts of rural Thailand, especially the impoverished, ethnographically distinct Northeast, have had a 
long relationship with NGO workers who have encouraged rights consciousness. See Prudhisan Jumbala 
& Maneerat Mitprasat, Non-governmental Development Organizations: Empowerment and Envi-
ronment, in POLITICAL CHANGE IN THAILAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 195 (Kevin Hewison 
ed., 1997). 
86. See Philip Hirsch, Environment and Environmentalism in Thailand· Material and Ideological Ba-
ses, in SEEING FOREST FOR TREES: ENVJRONMENT AND ENVJRONMENTALISM IN THAILAND 15, 33 
(Philip Hirsch ed., 1997); see also Frank Reynolds, Dhamma in Dispute: The Interactions ef Relig-
ion and Law in Thailand, 28 LAw& Soc'y REV. 433 (1994). 
87. Reynolds, supra note 86, at 440-42. 
88. Id. at 443-44. 
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can be mobilized by environmental movements to greater advantage than civil 
rights or property rights that might be considered more fundamental in Europe 
or the United States. Social change in Thailand provided an opportunity for the 
leaders of the Assembly of the Poor to deploy Buddhist environmental values to 
support their claim that the movement represented the nation in its struggle 
against the devastating and illegitimate forces of development. The claim drew 
support not only from other beleaguered villagers, but also from the increasingly 
politically active middle class. 
The engine of social change has been Thailand's booming economy following 
the end of the Vietnam War and the decline of communist influence in the rural 
areas of Eastern Thailand.89 Rapid growth accelerated exploitation of timber, 
waterways, and other natural resources, has had two profound political effects. 
First, the former political periphery, including the rural poor and ethnic minori-
ties living within the forests, or on its margins, or whose villages were in the 
future floodplain of a proposed dam, has become politically active. After years of 
contact with activist NGO workers, they have been motivated to seek redress 
from the government, and if none is forthcoming, to undertake direct action to 
save their homes and livelihoods. 90 They have been supported by international 
human rights and environmental NGOs opposing massive development projects 
worldwide that are planned and carried out without input from the communities 
they destroy. A particular target of NGO opposition has been one of the world's 
chief dam builders, the World Bank, a source of funding for the Pak Mun Dam in 
Northeast Thailand, which threatened to inundate many villages and became the 
focus of the Assembly of the Poor's most widely known campaign.91 
Thailand's boom has had the further effect of increasing the size of Thai-
land's "middle class." Although Thailand's varied social strata do not correspond 
easily to Europe and America's property owners and salaried tiers, an emerging 
middle class comprised of salaried and professional workers in government, uni-
versities, and industries, together with the rapidly growing numbers of entrepre-
neurs, is beginning to flex its political muscle. They support causes that express 
their values and their often critical views of government. On one hand, the 
environmental movement has been characterized by rural activism, supported by 
transnational and Thai NGOs and, significantly, activist monks whose actions 
and words mobilize the Thai civic religion with great power. On the other 
hand, a more technocratic, non-confrontational environmentalism is supported by 
89. See Philip Hirsch, The Politics ef Environment: Opposition and Legitimacy, in PrnJTICAL CHANGE 
IN THAILAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 179 (Kevin Hewison ed., 1997); see also Hirsch, supra 
note 88. 
90. See Jumbala & Mitprasat, supra note 85; see also BRUCE MISSINGHAM, THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PooR 
IN THAILAND (2003). 
91. M1ss1NGllAM, supra note 90. 
836 
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 51 I 2006/07 
the contributions of the "salariat,"92 including entrepreneurs who have found en-
vironmentalism a useful cause, and by transnational NGOs advocating "sustain-
able" or "responsible" development.93 Like environmentalism in the late 1960s in 
the United States94 and the activism for women's rights in countries which 
Merry studied,95 environmentalism in Thailand has brought together urban and 
rural, middle class and economically marginal, and rights conscious middle class 
Thai and more traditional rural Thai, notwithstanding survey data that reveal 
differences between their general perspectives on participatory democracy and the 
rule of law. 
After a long campaign by the Assembly of the Poor in opposition to the Pak 
Mun Dam, demonstrations and petitioning by the Assembly of the Poor achieved 
its greatest visibility just as the drafting of the new constitution reached its final 
stages. Perhaps as a result of this growing political activism in Thailand on these 
two broad fronts - rural activism and middle class mobilization - the 1997 
constitution provides special protections for environmental rights and for public 
participation in environmental decision-making.96 Thai environmentalism may 
be consistent with international rights advocacy but it also has roots in move-
ments like the Assembly of the Poor that draw on non-legal perceptions of justice 
and local claims grounded in unofficial law - the law of custom and tradition in 
rural communities.97 Perceptions of the environment that prevail in rural com-
munities and resonate with traditional Thai culture have had their influence, 
combining the language of customary law and justice with the technical language 
of sustainable development to contest the power of the government. Thus, politi-
cal activism is beginning to give meaning to participatory democracy through 
practices that will evolve step by step, adapting the universal rights framework 
to the complex and varied Thai culture and Thai institutions. 
These are case studies of "translation into the vernacular," and they draw 
attention to the power of the translators, or interpreters, of social injustice, rights, 
and the meaning of democracy. Some local election practices may reinforce ex-
92. Pasuk Pongpaichit & Chris Baker, Power in Transition: Thailand in the 1990s, in POLITICAL 
CHANGE IN THAlLAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 21, 32-35 (Kevin Hewison ed., 1996). 
Pongpaichit and Baker use this term to describe one of the relatively educated and well to do groups that 
make up the middle class in Thai society. 
93. Jumbala & Mitprasat, supra note 85. 
94. See generally KIRKPATRICK SALE, THE GREEN REVOLlTTION: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
MOVEMENT, 1962-1992 (1993). 
95. MERRY, supra note 4, at 208-17. 
96. CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF THAlL. §§ 56, 59. 
97. In terms suggested by Santos, supra note 11, at 63. Environmental rights link local perceptions of justice 
to transnational environmentalism. The linkage includes transnational environmentalism associated 
with pro-development interests, but also to progressive transnational conceptions that include respect for 
local determination and participation. Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito call this mix of transnational 
human rights and local liberatory interpretation "subaltern cosmopolitan legality." Id. at 44. 
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isting hierarchies of deference and power-holding unless a persuasive translator 
reinforces the belief that office holders are accountable to voters and to the law. 
The establishment of a unique National Election Corruption Commission by the 
new constitution shows that the drafters understood that the translation of de-
mocracy into practice would have to be regulated. The Assembly of the Poor 
succeeded in part because movement leaders translated the movement's social jus-
tice claims into a traditional discourse of responsibility to the environment that 
pre-dated the constitution and was more meaningful than a legal discourse bor-
rowed from international environmental rights advocates. Voters and movement 
participants who "take on" rights make difficult choices, and translators who in-
fluence perceptions of risks and benefits play a critical role. Success is critical as 
well. As Merry observed, when rights succeed, rights consciousness is reinforced; 
when they do not succeed, individuals may be more reluctant to take them on the 
next time, and rights consciousness weakens. 
Finally, the two case studies show that the process by which rights take hold 
is variable. The local context in which transplanted institutions or rights are 
deployed creates strategic choices for the Thai who accept, reject, or reinterpret the 
alternatives they are afforded by their new rights. Democracy as it is perceived 
by some Thai voters can be understood only in the context of a unique meaning of 
paternalistic representation. Likewise, social justice among the rural poor was 
grounded in the unique importance of the environment rather than a general 
belief in rights or democracy. We are learning a great deal about the different 
ways that rights can be perceived in other cultures. This variation was antici-
pated by Merry's observations of New Englanders, who constituted local property 
rights in a unique way. As we apply the methods of legal anthropology to law in 
developing societies, we are proceeding down a path blazed by the research of law 
and society scholars who have studied how rights become active in our own soci-
ety, and whose methods and insights may now help us understand the prospects 
for the development of rights throughout the world. 
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